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PROCEDURE -
JOINDER OF CLAIMS IN TORT AND CONTRACT
Action was brought to recover $650,000 damages alleged to have
been sustained as a result of improper and defective paint materials
furnished by Du Pont Company to Universal Corporation. The
notice of motion contained five counts, of which two were in
contract and three in tort. Defendant demurred to the notice of
motion upon several grounds, the principal one being misjoinder of
causes of action. The trial court overruled the demurrer and later
refused, on motion of defendant, to set aside the, jury's verdict in
favor of the plaintiff. Defendant appealed, assigning as one of
numerous errors the refusal of the trial court to sustain its demurrer
for misjoinder of causes of action. On appeal held, not error. "The
demands of the plaintiff are of the same nature and closely related.
Each arose out of the same general cause of action, in a continuous
course of dealing with reference to one subject, and one judgment
may be given." E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Universal
Moulded Products Corp., 191 Va. 525, 62 S. E. 2d 233 (1950).
The established rule of common law is that causes' of action may
be joined if they are of the same nature and the same judgment
may be rendered in each, although the pleas may be different.'
Thus a party having several causes of action of the same general
character and against the same defendant may unite them in one
suit,2 but causes of action distinct from one another and arising out
of different transactions cannot be joined.' The form rather than
the subject matter of the several counts determines their joinder in
many cases,' although the court will tend to construe the count
according to its true nature as tort or contract unless the form
clearly forbids.' Claims, likewise, cannot be joined at common law
if different forms of action are necessary, even though the facts are
closely connected.'
It is also a well established rule of common law that a cause of
action arising ex contractu cannot be joined with a cause of action
arising ex delicto, and it does not matter that the counts may be
perfect in themselves.7 The application of this principle has been
more injurious than beneficial to the plaintiff seeking relief on both
contract and tort theories, for he is forced to elect at his peril on
which legal theory he will proceed. The possibility is obvious that
he might elect himself out of court.8
Heretofore the prevalent opinion was that Virginia tended to
follow the common law rule prohibiting joinder of tort and con-
tract.9 However, the court in the Du Pont case, referring especially
to the Colonnal° and Kroger" cases, said, "Expressions . . . relied
on .by the defendant to sustain its contention that there was a mis-
joinder of counts, are purely dicta and contrary to previous Virginia
decisions.' '1 2 It was also stated, referring to the same cases, that
"the question of misjoinder was not before this court.'
In the Colonna case the plaintiff sued to recover damages for
illness caused by drinking infected milk sold to his father by defend-
ant. The notice of motion contained two counts, one in contract
and one in tort. The defendant's demurrer was sustained on the
ground of misjoinder of causes of action, and final judgment was
rendered thereon. This decision was affirmed on appeal; plaintiff,
however, did not assign as error the striking of the tort count. Thus
the court was obviously correct in saying in the Du Pont case that
the question of misjoinder was not before the court in the Colonna
case.
The plaintiff in the Kroger case brought an action for damages
due to injuries sustained from eating ham, which caused ptomaine
poisoning. The notice of motion contained two counts, one in
contract and the other in tort. Defendant's demurrer alleging
misjoinder of causes of action was overruled by the trial court, and
the Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed, holding this merely
harmless error, since the trial court, on motion of the defendant,
subsequently struck all of the plaintiff's evidence on negligence and
also instructed the jury to disregard it, leaving only the contract
or implied warranty. The defendant admitted in both courts that
he was not prejudiced by the trial court's ruling. The court,
referring to the misjoinder, stated: "It thus appears that there was
joined an action on contract and one in tort. This should not be
done," 14 citing the Colonna case and BURKS, PLEADING AND
PRACTICE." This section of BURKS, however, has been inter-
preted to apply only to the joinder of tort and the common law
action of assumpsit, rather than notice of motion procedure. 6 The
quoted statement may be considered as dictum, for it was not
essential to the determination of the case, since the appeal was based
primarily on the admissibility of evidence and not misjoinder of
causes of action.
In a more recent case' 7 involving the liability of a tenant for waste,
the plaintiff landlord proceeded by notice of motion founded upon
both contract and tort. The contract claim was based upon a
preliminary oral agreement between the plaintiff and defendant,
leasing property for a term of three years. Subsequently, a written
lease was forwarded to defendants which they refused to sign
because they desired a clause releasing them from liability in case
their business of rendering dead animals was enjoined. Never-
theless, the defendants remained on the premises for three and one
half years. The tort claim was based upon VA. CODE ANN.
§ 5509 (1942), now § 55-214 (1950), allowing a recovery for
wanton waste and for negligence of the defendant in not leaving
the premises in "good repair", ordinary wear and tear excepted.
The trial court sustained defendant's demurrer to the misjoinder
of causes of action, and the plaintiff elected to proceed in tort. The
trial court, however, allowed the unexecuted lease to be admitted in
evidence to show the relationship of the parties, and instructed the
jury that defendant was under a duty "to use ordinary care and
prudence to protect the leased premises, and to return the same at
the end of the lease in substantially the same condition as found."
The Supreme Court of Appeals held that the trial court acted
properly in requiring the election, but that it was error to admit
the unexecuted lease in evidence and to give the instruction, since
this allowed the plaintiff to proceed on both contract and tort as
though no election had been required. A statement of the court in
this respect is noteworthy: "While the court required the plaintiff
to elect which cause of action he would pursue, and he did elect to
proceed in tort, yet in the. trial of the case he was allowed to proceed
in both ways just as though no election had been required. This, of
course, was improper."' s
In conclusion, the issue of misjoinder was not before the court in
the Colonna case or necessary to the decision in the Kroger case.
However, in the Donovan case it was properly before the court and
passed on by it. Yet there was no reference to this decision in the
Du Pont case. The most logical and only justifiable conclusion,
therefore, is that the Du Pont and Donovan cases are clearly in
conflict. The court should have overruled the Donovan case, rather
than leave two necessarily conflicting decisions standing as law in
Virginia, while trying to reconcile the Colonna and Kroger cases.
The distinction between common law forms of action has largely
disappeared since the adoption of the notice of motion statute, a
tendency which is furthered by the New Rules of the Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals. 9 The notice of motion statute em-
phasizes the pleading of facts upon which the plaintiff claims relief,
and is designed to give him a simpler, better, and more expeditious
method of procedure.' Although the statute should be liberally
construed,!' some of the Virginia decisions have harked back to
the ancient common law system,' disregarding this aspect of notice
procedure. Now, however, the rule laid down in the Du Pont case
gives to the plaintiff a broader theory on which to base his action.
It brings out true notice procedure, for the purpose is to set forth
the facts clearly; and if a cause of action is stated, relief should be
granted, regardless of whether the claim set forth sounds in tort,
contract, or both.
WILSON 0. EDMUNDS
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